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The paper summarises research material on the outcomes of the public sector 
management regime, with an emphasis on material produced from 1995 to 
1999, covering the core public sector and Crown Entities.  It identifies an 
apparent consensus about the strengths and weaknesses of the regime and 
evidence to support the consensus.   
 
Strengths include: more efficient production of outputs; a more responsive and 
innovative public sector delivering better services; improved financial 
accountability; and improved overall fiscal control.   
 
The main weaknesses identified relate to the effectiveness of the regime in 
delivering outcomes.  The paper notes a widespread perception of a lack of 
empirical data on the effects of the reforms and comments on areas where further 





1 This report has been commissioned by the New Zealand Treasury to provide a
summary of research material on the outcomes of the current public sector
management regime, with an emphasis on material produced in the last five years.
The coverage includes the core public sector and Crown Entities, but not State-
Owned Enterprises. In general Crown Companies, educational institutions,
schools and hospitals are also excluded from coverage. The report is intended to
have a strongly empirical content, where possible drawing on quantitative
material, case studies or strong anecdotes. The full Terms of Reference appear in
Annex 1.
2 The objective of the report is not to present a review of the reforms. It is to briefly
identify what appears to be a consensus of the main strengths and weaknesses of
the reformed public sector management regime as it has developed since the late
1980s, and to focus on what evidence there is in support of these conclusions.W e
have made no attempt to reach our own conclusions on the outcomes of the
reforms or the efficiency or effectiveness of the current regime, nor to rank or
weight the views of others.
3 The report was prepared within a tightly constrained time frame. The approach
was therefore of necessity based around a literature search drawing on existing
bibliographies, and a review of material provided by the Treasury. It was not
possible to sight all the potentially relevant material, to conduct a comprehensive
review of all the material to hand, or to conduct a search for less well known
material. The expectation, however, is that most of the important material will
have been covered.
4 New Zealand’s public sector management reforms have attracted a lot of interest,
both within New Zealand and internationally. There is a wide range of views
about the success or otherwise of the reforms. There also seems to be some shift
in perceptions over time, as the disadvantages of the previous regime fade and the
weak points of the new regime become more apparent.
5 One area where there is a wide consensus, however, is over the difficulty of
evaluating the effects of the reforms. The difficulty of evaluation is partly due to
the problem of establishing the counterfactual. With so many reforms occurring
simultaneously, a period of fiscal restraint over much of the period, and other
changes in the political and economic environment, attributing observed changes
in outcomes to the public sector management reforms is extremely difficult.
6 There is also a widespread perception that there is a lack of empirical data on the
effects of the reforms:3
“Quantitative evidence of the effects of the reforms on the operations of
government departments is scarce. (OECD, 1996, p.108)
“…the available quantitative and qualitative data concerning the costs and
benefits of many of the changes is relatively sparse.” (Boston (1999), p.6).
“… there was a dearth of empirical data on which to assess the success of the
regime, even where criteria could be clearly defined.” (Kelsey, 1998), p.144).
7 The structure of the report is as follows:
Section II provides a brief description of the contrast between the old public sector
management system and the system put in place from the late 1980s.
Section III sets out the main strengths of the current public sector management
regime, as identified by various reviews, and describes the empirical support for
them
Section IV sets out the main weaknesses identified by various reviews, and
describes the empirical support for them
Section V comments on some broad areas where further evaluation may be
desirable, and contains some concluding remarks
II A Brief Synopsis of the Reforms of the Public Sector
Management System.
8 Well-known and serious problems in the management of the New Zealand public
sector were brought officially to notice in the Auditor General’s 1978 report on
financial management and control. That report found serious management and
operational deficiencies in many government departments.
9 A number of these deficiencies were set out by Treasury in 1984 in the briefing
document to the incoming Government, Economic Management. It identified the
core problems of the public sector as:
•  most departments had no clearly defined goals or management plan
•  there were few effective control mechanisms to review the performance of
departments in meeting the required outputs
•  departmental managers had little freedom to change the way their departments
operated to meet their goals, especially in staffing matters
•  too much influence was placed on control of inputs
•  there were no effective review mechanisms for dealing with poor performance
by senior management.
10 A theoretical framework was developed over the next 3-4 years which aimed to
address these and other problems. That framework drew heavily on principles in
the theoretical economic and management literature of that time dealing with4
principal/agency relationships, public choice and contractual models of
employment and service delivery. It also embodied elements of private sector
financial management practice, including especially accrual accounting
techniques.
11 The reform programme which developed from this framework involved the
consistent, sector-wide application of the following core themes:
•  decentralisation of management to departments
•  a separation of policy advice and operations where possible
•  the commercialisation of trading activities and the adoption of commercial
principles for the delivery of most core government services
•  strengthening of financial accountability and transparency
12 The key objectives of the reforms have been described as:
• assisting the government to translate its strategy into action.
• informing decision making and accountability.
• encouraging a responsive and efficient public sector. (Source: Treasury, “Putting
It Together”, p.67.).
13 These reforms were initially implemented primarily through new legislation
comprising the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the State Sector Act 1988 and
the Public Finance Act 1989. Aspects of the reforms had also been made possible
by the Official Information Act 1982 and were extended in some areas through
changes introduced under later legislation, particularly the Employment Contracts
Act 1991 and the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994.
14 The reform process involved a substantial degree of structural change in the
creation of State Owned Enterprises, Crown entities, re-structured departments
and sectors (e.g. science, forestry, conservation and social welfare) and the
introduction of school Boards of Trustees and new health management entities
(e.g. Regional Health Authorities, Health Funding Agency and Crown Health
Enterprises). The process of change has clearly been on-going during the 1990s
with some of these departments and entities being subsequently merged, re-
structured or dismantled in favour of new management structures.
15 The reforms have embraced a wide range of complex issues and changes. Many of
these changes have been part of a wider process of structural change within the
economy and need to viewed in that context. In this report, however, we focus
primarily on assessing the evidence of direct impacts from just the key managerial
reforms within the core public sector departments and agencies and Crown
entities.5
III Perceived Strengths of the Public Sector Management
System
16 The main strengths identified by a variety of reviews are:
(A) more efficient production of outputs
(B) a more responsive, innovative public sector delivering better services
(C) improved financial accountability
(D) improved overall fiscal control
17 Each of these perceived strengths is described briefly below, including references
to reviews or sources. The available empirical evidence is then discussed.
(A) More Efficient Production of Outputs
18 There is a fairly wide consensus that the reforms have resulted in a more efficient
public sector. For example:
The OECD concluded in 1999 that “...the core public sector has been reduced
substantially in terms of both its share of expenditures and employment. Given
that higher levels of outputs have been produced with lower levels of inputs,
productivity has increased, costs have come under better control due to accounting
changes and many departments have attained departmental surpluses.” (OECD,
1999, p.88).
Martin: “….the series of structural reforms which, under two governments...has
unquestionably assisted the achievement of considerable efficiency gains… ”
(Martin, 1995, p.37).
Kelsey (1998) “…some of the changes genuinely increased efficiency and
accountability. …”
19 In order to get a better reading on the impact of the reforms on productive
efficiency, however, it is necessary to go to a more dis-aggregated level.
20 There are four main sources of evidence on the impact of the reforms on
productive efficiency – that is, the ratio of inputs to outputs. These sources are:
a A Treasury study in 1996 on the effects of Financial Management Reform.
b Case studies of change in individual government agencies
c Output Price Reviews completed by central agencies since 1996.
d Process Reviews
Treasury’s 1996 Study6
21 In a 1996 paper Brumby et al studied productivity trends in the core government
sector by constructing average unit cost series for core “process” outputs supplied
by four departments. For one department (Valuation NZ) the study found clear
evidence of underlying productivity improvement since 1989/90: “The fall in
average unit costs for this aggregated series is of the order of 10-20 percent in
nominal terms between 1989/90 and 1994/95…” (p.19). For two other agencies
(The Immigration Service, and the Income Support Service) the study found
strongly declining average unit costs over some or all of the period studied, but
because volumes were also rising it was not possible to be certain that this
represented a rise in underlying productivity. For the fourth department (The
Department of Justice) the limited available data showed no evidence of
productivity gain either before or after the reforms.
22 The study concluded: “Results from the study….. are only a limited guide to
changes in productivity in the public sector as a whole, because of the small size
of the sample and the risk of sample selection bias….It should be pointed out
again here that the analysis of unit cost data cannot show how much of a change in
trend can be attributed to change in the public sector management system:
ministers may have been more determined to get results, or technological changes
may have offered greater gain….This unit cost evidence can reasonably be
interpreted as providing a measure of support for the proposition of improved
productivity performance in departments.” (p.24).
Case studies of change in individual government agencies.
23 A case study of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Mendzela,1994). While the
changes were internally initiated, Mendzela found that the techniques used (a
single explicit objective, output budgeting, restructuring, customer focus,
operating autonomy, and tight accountability) were similar to and heavily
influenced by the techniques used in the core state sector. The study concluded
that substantial real efficiency gains were achieved by management changes at the
RBNZ over a five year period to 1993. “…staff numbers and real operating costs
[both] fell 43 percent. At the same time effectiveness was maintained or
improved.” (p.iii). The unit cost of new note issue fell by one third. (p.10).
24 A case study of contracting out the functions of the Audit Office (McDonald and
Anderson (1997). After the first four tender rounds, between 1992 and 1994,
“Audit fees have been lowered by between 12 per cent and 25 per cent….The
response of those clients involved has been almost universally positive so far, and
there has been particular comment on the improvement in Audit New Zealand’s
performance over the last two years.” The study noted that the significant
unanswered question is whether or not the quality of audits has been affected, and
indicated experience had also revealed some negative factors and risks. For
example, the risk was noted of contracting firms to audit more political clients7
without full briefings on the auditor’s role.
25 A case study of the Income Support Service of the Department of Social Welfare
from 1992-1997. (Petrie, 1998). The study found evidence of “a significantly
increased workload, improved quality, a new capability to deliver customised
service, and substantially lower funding in real terms, all [pointing] to an
underlying increase in productive efficiency. This is consistent with the Treasury
study [Brumby et al, cited above]..for the period 1991/92-1993/94.” (p.58). The
combination of the case study, and the unit cost analysis might be seen as lending
weight to the conclusion of a favourable impact of public sector reform on
productive efficiency in IS. However, the study considers that, while public sector
reform was an essential pre-condition for the changes, there are a number of other
contributing factors, such as a new IT system, transformational leadership, and the
relatively non-complex nature of IS outputs.
Output Price Reviews.
26 An output price review is an exceptions-based process initiated by Chief
Executives who consider that they have reached the limits of productivity gain and
efficient operation within their existing baseline. The central agencies work
intensively with a department to assess the case for an increase in output prices.
This entails a fundamental review of the department’s efficiency, and generally
involves the use of outside specialist consultants. There have been three
completed output price reviews
1: of the Statistics Department, of Police, and of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. There has also been a Baseline Review
of the Education Review Office, which covers very similar ground.
27 Findings of these reviews that throw light on the productive efficiency of
departments include:
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade - the efficiency examination concluded
that MFAT had pursued reprioritization of outputs extensively in recent years, had
good input management processes and operated business activities at competitive
prices. Over the period 1992/93 to 1996/97 the Ministry absorbed (in addition to
inflation) an average of over $4 million a year in additional output and input cost.
During the five years to 1996/97 the Ministry also returned to the Crown some
$100 million, through a combination of mandatory savings, capital withdrawals
and asset sales. MFAT prices for the provision of PR activities were less than one
half of those quoted by external traders; for the provision of international legal
advice MFAT prices were less than one third.
• ERO – the review was satisfied that ERO is adopting good cost management
and organisational practices, and industrial relations strategies. “There appears to
be limited scope to secure significant additional savings within the organisation
over the short term….[There] does not appear to be any significant capacity for
ERO to reduce staff numbers without impacting on output delivery and/or future
1 A fourth, of Customs, is understood not to have been completed.8
capability… Our recommendation therefore is to support an increase in the ERO
output price….”
28 On the other hand the review of Police found scope to achieve savings in a
number of areas, particularly in relation to personnel expenses. The review also
highlighted deficiencies in Police’s management information systems. The
Statistics Review found in a pilot exercise that the current prices for two outputs
were broadly comparable to externally benchmarked prices, if anything slightly
above them.
29 The overall conclusion of these four reviews is clearly mixed. The Police review
found significant scope for further savings, and inadequate management
information systems. The ERO review found the Office to be operating
efficiently. A similar result emerged from the MFAT review, with in addition
some quantitative estimates of previous re-priorisation, and efficiency compared
to external comparators.
30 However, this is a very limited sample of departments, and one that seems likely
to be biased – the TOR for a Baseline review are written in such a way as to create
down-side as well as up-side risk for a department going through the process. It
seems more likely that departments reasonably confident of a positive outcome
would seek such a review.
Process Reviews
31 In 1993 Price Waterhouse surveyed government departments on the
implementation of the capital charge regime. The survey of ten departments
concluded that “there are sufficient examples of the way in which the charge has
influenced behaviour to state unequivocally that the concept has been
successful…”. The survey did find there was a notable variation in the extent to
which the capital charge has been integrated into departmental management
decision making.
32 A post-implementation review of the cash management reform project undertaken
by Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu in November 1990, which found quantifiable
government-wide benefits of over $37 million per annum from saving in interest
costs through departments using supplier credit, and eliminating idle balances in
imprest accounts.
(B) A More Responsive, Innovative Public Sector Providing Better Services
33 One of the central objectives of the reforms was to free managers from central
controls, and to give them the flexibility to use their superior information about
their particular activities and client needs to improve performance. Innovation and
the use of private sector management techniques were expected to result. The key9
mechanism to implement this change was the shift to appropriating by outputs
rather than inputs, together with the new accountability arrangements.
34 There is a widespread consensus that important benefits have flowed from these
changes.
“The results are in abundant evidence: strategic business plans, quality
improvement and customer service techniques, innovative employment and
compensation schemes, organisational development initiatives, use of information
technology to revolutionise business processes, and effective marketing and
public relations campaigns.” (SSC, 1998, p.9).
“There is evidence…of improvements in the quality of certain services (e.g. the
time taken to process applications for passports and welfare benefits has been
drastically reduced)…and major improvements in the quality of information
available to policy makers.” (Boston, 1999, p.13).
“Responsibility for HRM [human resource management] has been decentralised to
departments and devolved to line managers. There is no support from either union
or management for a return to the pre-1998 system. All believe that
decentralisation has been vital to the achievement of a range of HRM
reforms….Differences of opinion are mostly about the appropriate degree of
devolution within departments and the ability of line managers to carry out their
responsibilities.” (Boston et al, 1996, p.222).
35 Easton, however, contends that the reforms resulted in a reduction in service
provision; and that equity and fairness are no longer a consideration in setting
public sector remuneration. “Departments, already under pressure from
burgeoning demands…tended to reduce service as a means of coping with the
reduced resources available to them. There was no real mechanism for the
government to assess this service reduction.” (Easton, 1997, p. 176).
36 The 1991 Logan Review of the new public sector management system found that
the reforms had been well conceived and had brought significant benefits that
outweighed their costs. The Review consisted of interviews with Ministers and
senior managers, surveys of senior officials and finance and planning managers,
case studies of selected issues, and submissions. The devolution of HRM and
associated reforms were considered to have permitted more efficient recruitment,
retention, and management of people and to have improved HRM overall in the
public service.
37 In 1995 the OECD published an assessment of reforms to human resource
management in member countries (OECD 1995). The assessment was based on
information collected and analysed over several years, a questionnaire to all
OECD countries, and case studies in selected departments and agencies in nine
countries, including New Zealand. We are not aware which agencies in New
Zealand participated, or how many took part. The study found:
“The departments examined in New Zealand had made major changes to their10
performance management systems, so that individual performance agreements and
staff development plans are clearly geared to the achievement of corporate
objectives. Several departments felt they still had some way to go in achieving the
desired level of integration.” (OECD, 1995, p.132).
38 The Auditor General’s 1999 Report, "Towards Service Excellence" examines
practice in five agencies: Tenancy Services, Intellectual Property Office,
Department of Conservation, Passports Office, and NZ Customs. The study found
substantial evidence that the agencies had adopted contemporary business
practices and were strongly client-focused. Some were developing a systematic
approach to understanding who their clients were and their particular needs. Other
agencies needed to follow this approach. All agencies needed to develop better
communication with clients and to understand better the impact of their services
on the client.
39 There is further evidence of innovation and client focus from the series of case
studies published by Victoria Link, “Cases in Public Sector Innovation”. For
example: “In 1995 the new Department of Courts…set about changing its
processes, technology, and culture…By mid-1997, the unit responsible for
collecting and enforcing fines had switched its focus from reactive enforcement to
proactive, customer-centred collection…One manifestation of the new order was
the installation of a … Call Centre, staffed by people with a background in sales
and customer service rather than law enforcement.” (Smith and Norman, 1998,
p. 1).
40 Some evidence on the role of leadership in the implementation of the reforms can
be gleaned from “Change Manager Case Studies” produced by Smith and
Norman (see Smith and Norman, 1997 and 1998).
41 Some further evidence can be gleaned from the views of senior managers. In
research among a sample of senior level managers in 1994, Stace and Norman
found that agreed statements about what is working well in the new system
included:
“More ability and opportunity to change, develop, refocus departmental activity to
match changing needs.”
“A very clear focus on serving the Minister and the Government of the day rather
than private agendas.”
“The public service has become more client focused. The general public receive a
better service.”
Participants were nearly unanimous in endorsing the comment that “removal of
the monopoly service provision by…central supply and service agencies is a
healthy development.” (Stace and Norman, 1994, pp.27-28).
On the other hand the survey revealed strongly divided views on the effectiveness
of employment contracts, and concern that government restrictions meant that11
salaries are out of kilter with the private sector.
42 One particularly important concern raised about the quality of service delivery is
the appropriateness of mainstream government services for Maori. In 1991
Government transferred responsibility for programmes and initiatives aimed at
reducing Maori disadvantage previously administered by the Department of Maori
Affairs, to mainstream departments. As far as we are aware, no evidence has been
collected on the effectiveness of mainstreaming as a policy. Relevant factors here
are that Maori are disproportionately over-represented amongst the clients of
many mainstream departments and agencies, and the importance attached to
reducing the current disparities in social and economic outcomes between Maori
and non-Maori (as described in Te Puni Kokiri, 1998).
43 Boston, Martin, Pallot and Walsh state: “TPK has encountered significant
difficulties in undertaking its statutory responsibilities to monitor mainstream
programmes….Reasons for this include…..an understandable reluctance by
departments to have their performance scrutinised by yet another agency; TPK’s
lack of legislative authority to require agencies to provide the necessary
information; and the failure of many agencies to collect data relevant for the
purposes of assessing the impact of their services on Maori….More positively,
with public agencies contracting out an increasing range of services, Maori have
the opportunity to develop services specially geared to their needs” (Boston et al,
1996, p.157).
44 It is understood that a number of departments have information on Maori client
satisfaction with service delivery. One such survey of which we are aware is
“Maori Perceptions of Experiences of the Court System”, a report prepared for the
Department of Courts and the Ministry of Maori Development in August 1997.
We are not aware of any comparative surveys over time, however, nor of any
collation or analysis of survey information across agencies and departments.
45 One other commonly expressed concern about service delivery is what has been
termed the “silo effect”. This refers to a perception that, in rigorously pursuing the
delivery of outputs negotiated vertically agency by agency, some important cross
agency and cross-sectoral dimensions were lost sight of. (See for instance Schick,
1996, OECD, 1999). Other factors may have been an increase in the competitive
element between agencies associated with some of the reforms, and the disruption
caused by widespread restructuring. There is no hard evidence for this, given the
presence of confounding factors, such as the coinciding period of fiscal restraint in
the early 1990s. However, information coming out of the Strengthening Families
initiative relating to gaps and overlaps in funding and service delivery for children
in disadvantaged families perhaps provides some support for the contention. (See
Bazley, 1998, and Angus 1999). More importantly, perhaps, the evolution of the
Strengthening Families initiative might be seen as evidence of the system12
evolving in a positive direction.
46 Finally, there have been concerns about the inappropriate use of private sector
approaches in the public sector. For instance, commentators such as Martin (1995)
have pointed to concerns about government agencies viewing recipients of
services as clients when the services concerned are citizen entitlements
established in law. A somewhat different view, as suggested by the title, is
presented in The Victoria Link Case Study on the collection of court fines by the
Department for Courts, “Criminal or Customer?” (Smith and Norman, 1998).
(C) Improved Financial Accountability
47 A further hallmark of the reforms, viewed as a necessary concomitant for
delegating authority to department managers, was the conscious attempt to
strengthen accountability. A number of commentators have commented on this.
For example, Schick (1996) commented that in New Zealand accountability was
not treated as an afterthought, but was consciously built into the system at the
outset. “The most highly developed system for holding top managers personally
accountable for their own performance and that of their organisation is found in
New Zealand.” (OECD, 1995, p.132).
48 Stronger financial accountability in particular is seen as one of the clear successes
of the New Zealand reforms. This has been achieved through the adoption of
accrual budgeting for the full cost of outputs, new instruments such as Purchase
and Chief Executive Performance Agreements, and an increase in financial
reporting and transparency with respect to Parliament and the public.
49 The Auditor General audits departmental performance reports annually. Each dept
is rated against five criteria (220 assessments in total). In the 1996/97 audit of
departments he reported that about 70% of departments were rated good or
excellent for their financial management. In his First Report for 1999 there were
no assessments of "Not Adequate". The overall average of assessments has been
rising since 1994.
50 There is also a series of reviews of the financial management practices of
departments conducted as part of the Financial Management Assurance function
of the Treasury. These reviews generally show satisfactory financial management
practices and performance. For example:
• A review of departmental and Crown financial reporting information by Coopers
and Lybrand in 1995 found overall that information produced in “output” format
is reasonably accurate, at output class level. It did however note quite strong
concerns about the systems and the accuracy of data at a more detailed level than
output class, and to the costing information provided for management purposes
and information.
• A review of monthly financial reporting by Price Waterhouse in 1996 which13
found that the financial information provided to Treasury is generally robust.
• A review of purchasing practices by KPMG in 1998 found that departments
operate sufficient internal controls to ensure the maximum expected control
standards are met.
• A review of cash management systems by KPMG in 1999 found that controls
over cash management are adequate and are operating effectively.
• A review of physical assets by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 1999 found overall
that the internal control policies and systems, relating to physical assets recorded
in the Crown Financial Statements was found to be adequate.
51 Some additional evidence can be gleaned from the Stace and Norman survey of
senior managers. Senior managers agreed with the following statements:
“better financial discipline and checks on unnecessary activity” (as a result of user
pays).
“Better financial reporting in my organisation” and “at the government level.”
“The introduction of private sector methods of accounting rated more positives
and fewer negatives than any other feature of public sector change.”
52 On the other hand significant concerns have been expressed about accountability
in the Crown Entity sector. In 1996 the Treasury stated “There has been less
progress in clarifying the structures and accountabilities of some Crown entities.
Since the Crown entities area is very large, and it includes some substantial areas
of business, continued ambiguity of responsibility is a significant issue.”
(Treasury, 1996). The Auditor General reported in 1997 that the quality of
governance arrangements among six Crown entities studied varied markedly and
that there were some significant shortcomings in arrangements (Auditor General
97/1, p. 110). For example, no general practice existed of Ministers periodically
reviewing the purpose and operations of Crown entities.
53 A recent evaluation produced for Treasury concluded: “There appear to be a
number of problems associated with the ex ante accountability documentation in
the Crown entity sector, including poor specification of outputs, lack of clarity
about purchase and ownership, and lack of clarity about the purpose of specific
documents, caused in part by the diversity of arrangements within the sector and
lack of familiarity with the concept underlying the public management system.”
(Public Sector Performance (NZ) Ltd. and Hitchener, 1999).
54 In response to these problems the July 1999 Crown Entities Initiative sought for
the first time to set out clearly the expectations of Ministers, Boards, chief
executives, departments and central agencies.
55 There have also been concerns expressed about a diminishing of Ministerial
accountability. For example, Martin (1995, p.37) states: “…the more we fragment
the structure of government by replacing command hierarchies with networks of
contracts, the more we call in question the nature of responsible government by14
attenuating the responsibility of elected representatives.”
(D) Improved overall fiscal control
56 Over the ten years since the introduction of the public sector management reforms
there has been a significant improvement in New Zealand’s aggregate fiscal
performance. A number of commentators have attributed the reforms as being an
important contributing factor.
57 For example, the OECD has stated: “Although the effects of the public-
management reforms cannot be isolated from, say, the changing preferences of
politicians, the new management regime appears to be consistent with the restraint
of expenditure in the 1990s. In fact, the move to output budgeting, for example,
may have helped, by allowing ministers to make clear decisions about what they
were no longer going to purchase or what “prices” they were going to reduce…”
(OECD, 1996, pp107-108).
58 Brumby et al examined trends in central government expenditure since 1971/72.
They found that the historical trend of increasing central government spending as
a share of GDP was sharply reversed in the early 1990s. They also found that the
government’s demanding 1991 targets for reducing public expenditure by 1993/94
were achieved with some precision. “This shows that the new system of budgetary
control allowed tight expenditure control. It is possible that a sufficiently
determined government could have reversed the upwards expenditure trend with
the previous apparatus, but expenditure trends from earlier times suggest that
governments were not able to do this. New Zealand’s performance compared with
other countries also looks strong from this perspective….. The evidence is
therefore consistent with, although it does not conclusively establish, FMR
[financial management reform] having made it easier to control public
expenditure.”
59 OECD (1996, p.107-108) looked at changes in current consumption of central
government, a measure which they state at least excludes the effects on tax
revenue and social welfare benefit expenditure of macroeconomic developments
as well as certain policy changes unrelated to the public sector management
reforms. They found that real government consumption, measured in 1982/83
prices, has risen throughout the 1980s, but broadly stabilised over the period
1989/90 – 1994/95. They also found that removal of staff limits for government
departments in 1988 does not appear to have entailed any long-term increase in
employment. “instead, total employment in core government has fallen markedly
since then.” [from nearly 56,000 to less than 53,500].15
60 Some attempts have also been made to assess the extent to which the reforms
facilitated expenditure switching to reflect government priorities. Scott (1996,
p. 79) found that, while NZ governments have been able to change expenditure
directions both before and after the reforms, before the reforms the shift in
priorities was made more by new spending and at the expense of the deficit. After
the reforms, however, the shift was achieved more by reallocating spending.
(Scott (1996), p.79). Brumby et al find some evidence from analysis of cumulative
percentage change in SNA outlays by function, that reprioritisation decisions in
the period 1990/91-1993/94 were supported by the new financial management
apparatus. They caution however that there are weaknesses in the data, and make
the point that it is not possible to assess the relative contribution of the
government’s determination to implement change and the reformed system’s
ability to implement it.
61 An SSC survey of pre-SRA and post-SRA appropriations in four departments
(selected because of the importance of their contribution to a particular SRA)
showed that there was no significant shift in the resources allocated to these
departments, despite their new strategic responsibilities. (SSC, 1998, p.28).
62 Some support for the proposition that the reforms improved the government’s
ability to control and redirect public spending can be gleaned from consistent
statements made by senior Ministers.
63 For instance, Sir Geoffrey Palmer has said: “I shall never forget the experience of
being a new Minister of a reformist Government in 1984 when we were
confronted with a whole range of economic problems which demonstrated the
Government was not really in command of the public policy of the country at all.
Expenditure was driven by forces beyond the Government’s control….We set
about bringing about the conditions that allowed us to control the levels of
Government expenditure and priorities……The State-Owned Enterprises Act
1986, the Public Finance Act 1989 and the State Sector Act 1988 were all driven
by that imperative.” (Palmer, undated).
64 In his book “Government Reform in New Zealand”, Scott quotes the views of
successive Finance Ministers as follows: “David Caygill…..expressed his
satisfaction that the reforms had provided much improved information for budget
decision making. Ruth Richardson…is unequivocal in her view that the reforms to
core government administration gave her the “tools” to put the “lid” on public
expenditure and to shift priorities….Bill Birch, believes that the Government’s
abilities to prioritise and control spending have been enhanced by the reforms.”
(Scott (1996), pp.69-70).16
IV Perceived Weaknesses in the Public Sector Management
Regime
65 The main problems / weaknesses identified by a range of reviewers largely
concern the “effectiveness” of the new regime. This is in contrast to the
“efficiency” impacts which are widely regarded as being mainly positive, as
discussed in the previous section.
66 By “effectiveness”, we mean the extent to which the structure, rules, systems,
procedures and behaviour of the new public management regime deliver improved
outcomes. While there is certainly agreement amongst many reviewers of
improved effectiveness arising from the commercialisation of many government
services, the effects of the reforms on the provision of policy advice and the
delivery of effective “social services” (health, education, housing, welfare
entitlements, Maori development, etc) and regulation are seen as more
problematic.
67 To assess the views and evidence on these problems, we have broken down the
“problems/weaknesses” identified by reviewers into a number of component parts.
The first four of these in particular relate to the “effectiveness” issue:
A)The Alignment of Outputs with Outcomes
B)Weaknesses in the Link Between Government Strategy and Budget Spending
C)The Potential for Conflict Between Purchase and Ownership Interests
D)Problems in Contracting for Outputs
E) Unforeseen Consequences of the New Regime
F) Uneven Performance of Departments and Agencies
68 Each of these perceived weaknesses is described briefly below, including
references to reviews or sources and discussion of the evidence.
A. Aligning Departmental Outputs with Government Outcomes
69 A major component of the budget management reforms introduced under the
Public Finance Act 1989 involved a switch from input to output budgeting. This
innovation was designed to address three key issues: improved accountability by
departments for their expenditure allocations, more efficient delivery of policy17
advice and operations and improved targeting of expenditure on policy objectives.
70 The documentation we have examined suggests a consensus for the conclusion
that only the first two objectives have been achieved: improved accountability and
more efficient production of outputs. A range of commentators, reviewers and
those involved in managing the system - e.g. Schick (1996), Boston (1999), Scott
(1996), Auditor-General (1999/3), Laking (1999) and Upton (1999) - have all
drawn attention to the problems of linkage between outputs and outcomes. David
Osborne
2 has gone considerably further: he argued that a major task for New
Zealand is now to shift from output to outcome budgeting in which budget
allocations are determined by programme or strategy, not output class.
71 In practice, there are two quite different aspects to this problem: the difficulty in
relating specific departmental outputs to broadly defined outcomes, and the issue
of diffused responsibility for the monitoring and achievement of outcomes. These
two dimensions are reflected in the following quotes:
“In the context of relating classes of outputs to outcomes, the term “link” (as
used in the Public Finance Act 1989) has been interpreted narrowly. Usually, it
has been thought sufficient simply to assert that a class of outputs will contribute
to an outcome without describing how it is expected to do so.” (Auditor-General
1999/3, p.46)
“…there is scope for more innovation and policy evaluation in New Zealand’s
public sector. Neither departments, nor central agencies, extensively monitor and
evaluate outcomes.” (OECD 1999, p.88).
72 Efforts to improve the specification of outputs over recent years have largely
failed to resolve the problem that most, if not all, departments and agencies are
still unable to draw a strong connection between their outputs and the resulting
impact on Government’s policy objectives. One consequence of the perceived
“policy failures” arising from this alignment problem is that departments or
agencies, in the understandable interests of showing policy results, may bypass the
output/outcome relationship altogether by defining new and/or additional policy
objectives outside the outputs/outcomes framework specified under the Public
Finance Act - e.g. Ministry of Science, Research & Technology
3.
73 The annual process of output specification requires departments and agencies to
re-evaluate how their activities might best contribute to Government’s objectives,
expressed in the outcome statements (and, to a lesser extent, the strategic
2 Author of “Re-inventing Government”, and member of The Public Strategies Group in a seminar to the
Institutue of Public Administration, Victoria University, 9 November 1999.
3 Blueprint for Change, Minister of Research, Science and Technology, May 1999. In this case, it is also
proposed that the newly defined “target outcomes” would apply across related Votes (i.e. not only Vote:
RS&T, but also to the research components of Votes Education, Environment, etc.).18
priorities). Through this process, it should be possible to seek continuous
improvement in the alignment of outputs and outcomes. However, there does not
appear to be any evidence for these achievements.
74 The relative absence of detailed performance evaluation for public expenditure
programmes has meant that the alignment of outputs with outcomes, although
recognised as a problem, has not yet, as far as we aware, been addressed in any
systematic way. None of the several major reviews and commentaries we cite
above appears to base their misgivings on more than anecdotal or casual evidence
of this problem.
B. Weaknesses in the Link Between Government Strategy and Budget
Spending
75 In recent years, the Government has given increased attention to providing an
overall strategic focus for policy interventions. This process has been formalised
through the development of “Strategic Priorities and Overarching Goals”
(SPOGs), Strategic Result Areas (SRAs) and Key Result Areas (KRAs). Several
reviewers have noted that this strategic framework, including the various
instruments through which the strategic objectives are intended to be translated
through to departmental operations, has so far produced only mixed results. A
study by the SSC (1997) concluded that the system, overall, had clarified the
strategic objectives of Government and improved the “strategic conversation”
between Ministers and chief executives. However, standards tended to be uneven
across departments and many KRAs lacked sufficient emphasis on results or
involved milestones which lacked challenge.
76 Even though there has been on-going improvement in the specification of KRAs
the SSC (1998) still concluded that the “main area for improvement (concerned)
the weak connection between strategy and spending”. It argued that a key part of
the problem stemmed from the fact that private sector approaches to strategic
management could not be as readily applied in the public sector given that
governments invariably have multiple objectives - i.e. they lack the private
sector’s “single, coherent sense of purpose”.
77 The Controller and Auditor-General (1999/3, p. 48) raises a different problem
with regard to the use of SPOGs, SRAs and KRAs as a strategic framework for
public policy. He considers these instruments “have also been used as a substitute
remedy for problems with the current accountability regime that should perhaps
be corrected more formally.” The “problems” referred to appear to be perceived
shortcomings in the specification of government outcomes and their links to
government outputs (discussed below). The Auditor-General also notes concern
that SRAs/KRA’s are not part of any legislation and that, to the extent that this
strategic framework substitutes for outcome statement deficiencies, it risks being19
“unlawful” (p. 49).
78 Although the specification of the strategic framework is improving, other
reviewers also conclude that it continues to have limited influence on spending
decisions - e.g. OECD (1999), p.88: “…there is scope to strengthen the linkages
between the budget and the government’s wider economic strategy, since the
former does not necessarily allocate resources in an optimal manner.”
79 The observation has been made (e.g. SSC, 1998) that most budget allocations
have a strong historical bias which militates against short-term re-direction of
resources to new strategic priorities. There is also the problem that most strategic
priorities have tended to be broadly defined. As such, they may add little to
Government’s existing “outcomes” as a directional focus for budget decisions.
Conversely, the specification of KRAs has often been too narrow, thus failing to
act as an effective link between strategic goals and departmental activities.
80 Firm evidence of the lack of connection between strategy and budget allocation
and implementation is not readily available. However, at least one minister is on
record as expressing frustration with the process: “Ultimately, if any government
wants traction on a strategic goal it needs to coordinate a coherent, well-
researched and well-funded initiative…My own view is that the current SRAs are
so broad and encompass so many activities that they cease to be useful.” (Upton,
1999, p.13).
81 A 1998 survey of five ministers and 14 senior departmental officials by Brenda
Tahi suggests there is a problem that the SRAs are seen as a product of the
bureaucracy and are not owned by ministers - although the sample for this
particular question seems to be very small. (Tahi, 1998, p.29.)
82 Laking (1999) has considered the public sector management regime from the
point of view of its capability to deliver on strategic goals. He suggests that the
language of government strategic objectives may be in the category of
“deliberately emergent” - i.e. not too precise and not too vague - while the
substructure for strategy (SRAs and KRAs) is built on the tightly defined model of
output specification. He concludes that there may be a problem here (combined
with other complications arising from principal/agent relationships and other
political factors) such that governments may have considerable difficulty in
specifying meaningful strategies in advance and in predicting the consequences of
their actions.
83 The general lack of empirical evidence concerning these weaknesses may be
attributed to the fact that the strategic framework has only been fully developed to
its present form in the last two years. Hence, there has been limited time for new
strategic directions and priorities to flow through into budget policy. (It could be
argued that the new spending priorities identified in the Coalition Agreement did20
not arise out of the formal strategic development process.) Part of the problem
may also be that the broad scope of the Government’s SPOG’s means that most
current expenditure policy is, arguably, already consistent with those objectives
and that measurable changes in policy are so far unlikely.
(C) The Potential for Conflict Between Purchase and Ownership Interests
84 The Government has two main interests relating to the operation of public sector
departments and agencies: the efficient supply of outputs determined primarily
through the purchase relationship, and the longer term effectiveness, or
capabilities, of the organisation to deliver on the government’s policy goals.
85 Schick, (1996), SSC (1998) and Boston, (1999), have all noted the potential
tension which exists between these interests. They argue that the desire for an
efficient, low cost provision of outputs may be achieved at the expense of the
longer term capability of the organisation. Thus, providing outputs at lower cost
and meeting output performance measures may result in under-investment in
management and staff development and in a deterioration in the integrity and the
longer term commitment of employees.
86 There is broad agreement in the documents and publications we have reviewed
that, in practice, the purchase interest has the potential to dominate the ownership
interest under the new management regime. However, again, none of these
documents - including the SSC, (1998), presented detailed evidence for their
conclusions. The SSC (1998, p.14) states: “A number of departments display
evidence of a high level of stress in terms of work-place relations and effective
performance. They demonstrate low morale, employee dissatisfaction, and
tensions between managers and staff….Some of this is an inevitable consequence
of sustained pressure for performance improvement and cost control, but it may
also be symptomatic of other things, such as cumulative under-investment in skills
and technology and unrealistic output volumes and prices.”
87 Perhaps some limited evidence of this problem is visible with respect to the
Statistics New Zealand Output Price Review, which found that “SNZ’s most
immediate capability risk is related to its financial condition. Officially sanctioned
ongoing deficits have resulted in depleted taxpayers funds and an unsustainable
negative cash position.” However, the review also found there was no positive
evidence that SNZ was being underfunded or overfunded, and found scope for
reprioritisation within the baseline. In any case, little weight can be placed on a
sample of one department.
88 A recent review of ex ante accountability documentation found that “the
documents individually and as a set do not adequately reflect the ownership21
dimension of performance, in particular non-financial aspects of performance
relating to future capability….reporting on each minister’s accountability for the
total activities of a portfolio is not comprehensive, particularly in terms of
ownership performance.” (Public Sector Peformance and Hitchener, 1999).
89 Responses to the survey of public sector managers by Norman (1995) also imply
that the problem may be real. The goal of more efficient provision of outputs
seems to have increased the attractiveness and use of short-term contracts.
However, some managers considered that this practice “worked against team
ownership and responsibility” and had led to “less commitment and loyalty to the
public service or the organisation” (p.24). These views are balanced to some
extent by the general conclusion of the response group that the changes to the
system “had enabled public servants to grow in expertise and professionalism.”
90 The Auditor-General (1999) is less ambivalent, though again the problem is
implied, rather than directly encountered. In his review of “capability
expenditure” he concluded that:
“…at present there is no agreed means by which departments can establish
realistic limits on the efficiency of their present output production methods. In the
absence of this information, they are likely to have difficulty in resisting demands
to achieve additional efficiencies. When realistic limits have been reached, the
probable result of demands for additional efficiencies is poorer quality outputs.
Given the current weaknesses in output specification and performance
measurement, the loss of quality may not be readily apparent unless damaging or
disastrous events begin to occur. (p.73)
(D) Contracting for Outputs
91 The majority of outputs from departments and agencies are contracted for through
purchase agreements with the relevant minister. The underlying model is
essentially a commercial one in which ministers and departments act as willing
buyers and sellers of required outputs, whether they be services, policy advice or
specific goods. The key advantage of this relationship is that should encourage
clarity of purpose and specific accountability.
92 Boston, (1999), SSC, (1998), Easton, (1997) and Schick, (1996), however, note
that the implied model in the purchasing relationship - i.e. a “marketplace”
involving both buyers and sellers in a situation of competitive supply - does not
accord well with reality. Much of the purchase activity within the public sector
takes place in a non-competitive, or only partially competitive, environment.
Thus, it is argued that there is often very limited scope for the “disciplines” of the
market to ensure satisfactory, cost-effective outcomes. Schick (1996) and Easton
(1997) argue that where outputs are difficult to define there is a legitimate interest22
in the major inputs used to produce the output.
93 The problem is summarised by the SSC (1998, p.10):
The (purchase) model is that of the market place: buyer and seller haggling over
price against a backdrop of competitive supply, discriminating demand, efficient
price, symmetrical information and minimal transactions costs. Experience has
shown, however, that none of the model’s conditions can be reliably satisfied,
even in a weak form, in the NZPS [NZ Public Service]. The market for NZPS
outputs is characterised by monopoly supply, compliant demand, arbitrary price,
asymmetry of information and time horizon, and significant transactions costs,
many of which arise well after the transaction.
The concept of an efficient market fundamentally misrepresents the nature of
NZPS production and exchange.”
94 The perceived problems associated with contracting for outputs have a number of
dimensions. Boston (1999) focuses on the limited information and interest which
ministers have in the purchase relationship. He doubts whether some ministers are
as ‘discerning” as the model implies or whether accurate pricing of outputs is even
possible in the absence of competitive supply and where other forms of
benchmarking is difficult.
95 The OECD (1996) also records these constraints associated with the purchasing
model, but acknowledges that empirical assessment of the effects (including other
budget management reforms) is difficult. Overall, it considers that the package of
budget reforms is probably supported by improvements in the aggregate fiscal
position of the Government. At the micro level, it cites the health sector as one in
which the competitive purchasing relationship generally did not appear to have
worked well, with the possible exception of the supply of residential care and
some non-urgent surgery.
96 The Auditor-General (1999, pp. 68-69) raises a slightly different issue with regard
to the effectiveness of the purchase relationship. The Purchase Agreement
between a minister and department is essentially a quasi-contract that specifies the
detail of outputs to be supplied and the price which is to be paid. In most cases,
these agreements provide for some flexibility to vary outputs, provided that such
changes do not conflict with appropriations or the descriptions of outputs as
contained in the Estimates.
97 In practice, purchase agreements tend to be much more detailed than the
Estimates. The Auditor-General suggests that this may provide the Executive with
a degree of information and flexibility not available to Parliament, thereby
abrogating it of specific authority. He also notes that there appears to be little clear
guidance on what purchase agreements can and should contain and how these23
agreements should relate to various other official documents of entity purpose: for
example Statements of Intent and Strategic Plans.
98 Much attention by departments has also been focused on the “specification of
outputs” aspect of this problem. Initially, poor output specification limited the
effectiveness of the “contractual relationship”, both in terms of what departments
were being asked to provide and their capacity to review and assess their output
performance.
99 Concern with this problem, and the implications that it has for budget allocations
and performance assessment, has created a potential for what some reviewers (e.g.
Schick, 1996) argue has now become a tendency for “excessive” specification of
outputs. Managerial accountability may have improved, but at the expense of
managerial responsibility for results. Schick also warned that a highly contractual
approach may diminish public-regarding values and behaviour.
100 Schick also notes that the added cost and rigidity incurred by excessive output
specification is reinforced in the performance agreements of chief executives. The
requirement for detail is argued to lie in the importance of these documents for
later assessment of accountability and performance. It is seen, however, as being
at odds with the requirement for leadership, flexibility in responding to changed
circumstances, innovation in policy advice and service delivery and an appropriate
level of risk-taking (SSC, 1998).
101 Other problems also noted by the Auditor-General 1999/3 include the high
compliance costs, especially for smaller departments, in specifying and costing
outputs. At the same time, at least one minister (Upton, 1999) has commented on
the “silo” effect of this contracting of outputs: each department tends to take a
narrow view of what it is responsible for without knowing or assessing what other
departments may be doing in this area or how budget resources as a whole could
be more effectively deployed across the public sector in pursuit of the relevant
policy goal. This has been confirmed to some extent by Norman (1995) whose
survey of managers elicited the response: “… the atomised nature of the public
service means that we don’t know a lot about each other’s departments and
services.” (p.23)
102 However, while it is not clear from these arguments how much effect the lack of a
competitive market environment for outputs may have on contractual efficiency,
several operational studies suggest that there is cause for concern. A 1995 review
for the Treasury by Coopers and Lybrand found that departmental and Crown
financial reporting information is reasonably accurate at output class level.
However, the reviewers had “a number of quite strong reservations about both
the systems and the accuracy of the data provided…These reservations relate to
financial information at a more detailed level than output class and to the costing
provided for management purposes and information.” The Output Price reviews24
of Statistics NZ and Police also found weaknesses in their cost allocation systems.
The Output Price Review of Police found that financial information was not
collected by output, and there was a lack of meaningful performance measures
associated with output delivery.
103 The Output Price Review of Statistics NZ also demonstrated the difficulty of
benchmarking output prices against external comparators when there are no
external producers of most of the outputs, and when there is a large number of
different and interdependent production processes involved.
104 A 1997 review for the Treasury of contracting in central government found that
“formal evaluation of contractors’ ongoing performance was often lacking. This
creates a risk that the department is not receiving value for money from
contracting and creates operational risks as to the quality of service delivery.” The
same review found “generally there appeared to be little focus on contracting at a
strategic level, except where outsourcing of departmental functions were
undertaken…..this translates into a risk that inefficiencies may arise where
contracting is inconsistent with strategy, or where contracting is not actively
pursued.” (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (1997), pp.4-6).
(E) Unforeseen Consequences of the New Regime
105 Major changes in the public sector management regime were widely expected to
involve significant adjustment costs, both for individual employees in the public
sector and for the Budget as a whole. However, the scale of impacts may have had
a longer term effect on individuals than had been anticipated and therefore on the
quality and performance of the new regime.
106 In a similar sense, some of the impacts of the new regime have not been limited
just to the adjustment process but are argued to have imposed on-going costs for
sections of the community. Some of these costs are argued to have fallen
disproportionately on some sectors of the population and on some communities in
ways which were not intended or foreseen and which could undermine the
benefits and durability of the new regime and/or militate against further
improvements.
107 A consensus view in the managers surveyed by Norman (1995), was that:“ t h e r e
is now a legacy of some mistrust that may well impede future changes” and that
there had been a misplaced emphasis on speed of reform, combined with a
“horrendous loss of institutional memory”. Other managers expressed the view
that there had been “a corrosion of loyalty to the public service”. Maharey,
(1999), refers to the need for re-establishing a “common ethic” and “cohesive
culture” in the public sector.25
108 There is little empirical evidence of the views of front-line and lower level staff.
However, something can be gleaned from one or two case studies:
“Change was often traumatic….communication between management and staff
deteriorated when staff numbers continued to fall. Redundancy arrangements
became especially contentious. Staff who were leaving often felt aggrieved, while
those kept on saw less valuable staff receive generous redundancy payments. The
reward for competence and motivation appeared to be sterner performance
requirements, with remuneration falling as fringe benefits were cut back. Staff
grew cynical as total numbers fell but senior management numbers did not.
Morale fell.” (Mendzela (1994), pp.7-8).
“The PSA considers front line IS [Income Support] staff reacted badly to many of
the changes. “Many found the new image insulting to the intelligence. They felt
they were just cogs in the wheel, and their views on how service could be
improved were rejected. The whole process was very directive from the top.”
(Petrie (1998), p.25).
“Internal issues have clustered around the management of culture change…..As a
result, staff have felt stressed out, disempowered, and shell-shocked.” (French
(1999).
109 The Auditor-General (1999/3), also notes that the process of organisational
restructuring has continued much longer than expected in some departments
leading to a possible loss of focus, a decline in loyalty of some employees, an
inefficient allocation of management and staff time away from the core functions
and business and unnecessarily high transactions costs. The health sector is cited
as an example of this problem. Logan (1991) noted the potential down-side of
what was seen then as an apparently drawn out reform process after just 3-4 years.
110 The decentralised nature of the reform process has also meant that various
agencies have made what appear to be individually sensible rationalisations of
services without considering the wider, cumulative impacts of these decisions.
The SSC (1998) cites the concerns reported to it that provincial areas in particular
have borne a disproportionately high degree of the impact from the reduction and
centralisation (or modernisation of delivery mechanisms) in many government
services. The “atomisation” of functions referred to earlier is argued to have had,
as one of its consequences, an inability for Government to see and respond
effectively to these cumulative impacts (Upton, 1999).
(E)Uneven Performance Across Departments/Agencies
111 While there is general acceptance that the managerial reforms have been applied
consistently across departments, the impact in terms of improved policy advice,
more efficient provision of outputs, stronger accountability and better delivery of26
services is seen in some of the documentation we have reviewed as being quite
uneven. The notion that some disparity of performance exists - and may reflect
something about the way the reforms have been applied - is supported by the
OECD (1996, p.109) which comments on “…the extent to which behaviour has
changed varies across public-sector institutions…”.
112 A number of reasons have been put forward for this uneven performance. The
SSC (1998) acknowledge that the proliferation of small departments and entities
may have over-extended the supply of capable senior managers available to the
public service. Similarly, Boston, (1999), suggests that smaller departments may
have difficulty in simply achieving a “critical mass of analytical talent”. At the
same time, the creation of multiple boards and advisory committees may have
exhausted the supply of committed and able persons available to sit on them - at
least to the degree where conflicts of interest can be fully avoided (Boston, 1999).
113 Public (and in some cases political) perceptions of this variation have also been
evident from the extent of scrutiny and criticism which some departments have
received (e.g. IRD, WINZ and Conservation) compared to others which have
attracted little attention despite equally dramatic restructuring.
114 This perceived variation may simply be attributable to the degree of controversy
associated with their respective activities, their size or other policy changes.
However, it may also indicate that aspects of the new managerial regime have in
fact been less successfully applied in some organisations or sectors.
115 It is perhaps suggestive that the four output price reviews referred to above found
considerable variation in performance even amongst this self selected group of
agencies. Bushnell (1998) reports a high degree of variation in the daily costs of
policy advice from different departments, even after allowing for significant
different structures and cost environments. The unmeasured dimension here was
the quality of policy advice. Boston (1996, p.133) states that informal evidence
suggests the performance of departments in the provision of policy advice varies
considerably. “Some have acquired a well-deserved reputation for producing
excellent work, whereas others have been much less successful.” It is not clear
what evidence there is for this.
116 There is however considerable evidence of uneven performance in a number of
performance reviews. For example, the reviews of financial management
performance by the Auditor General, the review of the use of consultants
(Auditor-General (1997), the review of departmental costing systems (Coopers
and Lybrand, 1995), the review of the implementation of the capital charge (Price
Waterhouse, 1993), the review of Crown entity governance (Auditor General
1997/1), and the review for the Treasury of contracting in central government
(Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (1997).27
V Areas Where Further Evaluation May Be Desirable
117 This review of the evidence on the impact of the public sector management reform
has covered over 40 different reviews, reports and presentations. Within this body
of documentation there is significant consensus on the major strengths and
weaknesses, though this appears to be based on relatively little detailed analysis or
empirical evidence. In particular, views on the weaknesses of the new regime
appear to be mostly unsupported by clearly documented empirical evidence.
118 A number of suggestions have been made by those who have reviewed and
commented on the effects of the public sector management reforms. A selection of
these is contained below. It is important to note that some of these comments were
made some time ago.
• “….there remains considerable scope for further research on the virtues and
vices of the reformed public sector…” (Boston (1999), p.26). “…if the public
management reforms in New Zealand are to be properly assessed, only a
systematic and comprehensive approach will suffice.” (ibid, p.7)
• It is important to research the impacts of the new regime on staff (Schick 1996).
• “…there is a pressing need for survey data on HRM [human resource
management] policies and practices across the public sector.” (Boston et al, 1996,
p.217).
• “Further case studies need to be done to form deeper judgements about the
sources of performance improvement in departments...” Scott (1996), p.17.
• John Martin has suggested there is scope for rewarding and on-going research
on the advantages and disadvantages of the quasi-contractual arrangements
between Ministers and entities. (Martin (1995), pp.49-50).
• “Better information on [departmental] performance is essential for enforcing
accountability.” Treasury (1996, p. 111).
• Brumby et al suggest extending their analysis of unit costs to more process
outputs (for example of IRD, Customs, Police, and of the main Crown entities).
They also suggest attempting to establish the extent to which productivity
improvements were caused by an independent influence, such as automation. “A
useful complementary approach may be case studies of change in organisations
over the period…This approach will be most useful when it can be set alongside
hard evidence of the effects of change.” Brumby et al (1996, p.22.). They also28
suggest further study is required on the possible contribution of the reforms to the
ability of government to allocate resources in keeping with its priorities.
• “…the government should make analyses of the impact of mainstreaming
[services to Maori] a priority. The current lack of thoroughgoing studies is
lamentable.” (Boston et al, 1996, p.157).
• The SSC, in its 1998 “Assessment of the State of the NZ Public Service”, make
a number of statements that suggest the need for additional evaluation and
assessment. These include:
“Good strategy and intelligent government are impossible without the regular
empirical assessment that leads to change in strategy…but outcome evaluation has
largely not occurred.” (p.26).
“A better understanding of the operation of the public-sector labour market is also
crucial – how it affects institutional capability, and what interventions might be
needed to offset its adverse features.” (p.33).
“There is no systematic reappraisal of real departmental costs….the lack of such
appraisal is cause for concern.” (p.29).
“The management of government-held information is critical, but the NZ Public
Service has no means currently of systematically assessing information quality
and management.” (p.18).
119 Beyond these suggestions, there is a broad consensus that a key weakness in the
current regime is the lack of information on the effectiveness of the public sector.
In essence, the current regime may be reasonably efficient in producing outputs,
but the outputs may be the wrong ones. This suggests that a priority for effort
should be assessing the current state of capability of the system in this regard, and
investigating promising approaches that could improve capability in a cost-
effective manner. One particular area that is frequently highlighted is the
importance of better assessing the effectiveness of services provided to Maori.
120 As noted, there is also a wide consensus that the reforms have resulted in an
improvement in the efficiency of the core public sector – although there is an
enduring need to constantly assess the efficiency of departments and Crown
entities given the difficulty of performance measurement in much of the core
public sector. However, many reviewers have significant concerns about the
effectiveness of the strategic management system, and the longer-term capability
of the system.
121 The potential problem that any Government may have difficulty in converting its
overall strategy into re-focused policy/expenditure decisions is sufficiently serious
to warrant closer analysis. Whether this problem could be addressed, as the
Auditor-General suggests (1999/3, p. 49) through improved specification of
outcomes or, as the SSC suggests (1998, p.8) through improvements to the
“strategic management methodology” could be a worthy focus for that further29
investigation.
122 There is a cluster of issues around capability that are suggested for further
investigation. These include the adequacy of output prices, the impacts on lower
level staff of operating in the new system, and the adequacy of senior management
development. The reasons for the on-going observations of variability in
performance across departments and agencies may also repay further
investigation.
123 In considering the need for further research and evaluation, criteria that should be
applied are:
• tractability – how amenable is the issue to empirical evaluation.
• policy relevance – how important will the information generated be for future
decisions on design of the public sector management system.
• cost- effectiveness – how favourable is the ratio of expected benefits to expected
costs.
124 A key strategic issue is getting the right balance between centralised and
decentralised responsibilities for evaluation. One means of improving system
performance is to attempt to strengthen incentives on departments to improve
their understanding of the impacts of their policies, and to demonstrate their
efficiency. An alternative approach is a more prescriptive and centralised
approach in which departments and agencies are required to follow certain
prescribed procedures. These are clearly not mutually exclusive. Whatever
approach is pursued, however, it is important that there be a clear strategy for
ensuring adequate and effective investment in assessing the effectiveness and
efficiency of the public sector management system.
125 A key first step, however, in considering whether and where additional resources
should be invested, is to ensure that best use is made of existing information. It
seems likely that there is useful information within government departments,
Crown entities, and possibly outside the government, that is not generally known,
on the effects of the reforms and the operation of the current regime. It may also
be useful to assess whether the information available publicly is sufficient to
facilitate detailed analysis and research by those working outside the government.30
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Annex 1
Terms of Reference for Review of Evidence on Broad Outcome
of Public Sector Management Regime 30/11/99
The Crown is seeking a report summarising research material on the outcomes of the
current public sector management regime written over the last decade, with a particular
emphasis on material written in the last five years (the “report”).
Purpose of Report
The report will be drawn upon by the Crown in preparing its own reports, briefing
material on the outcomes from the regime and in considering further evaluation work to
plug identified gaps.
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING OUTCOMES
Boston (1999), pages 8 to 11, suggests criteria for evaluating outcomes which may be of
assistance in considering outcomes. These include:




5. Institutional design criteria
6. Management criteria
7. Ownership interest criteria
8. Purchase interest criteria
9. Client and citizenship criteria
10. Information-related criteria
All of these are likely to be relevant to some extent, but with economic and financial
criteria being particularly important.
The perspective for the evaluation should generally be that of New Zealand’s interests as
a whole, rather than that of any single group, such as Parliament, the Executive or
particular private interests. Brief comment on effects on individual group interests may
be appropriate, at the contractor’s discretion.
EMPIRICAL EMPHASIS
The report should have a strongly empirical content, where possible drawing on
quantitative material, case studies or strong anecdotes. It should cite the specific research36
material used as evidence and briefly assess any obvious strengths and weaknesses of the
material.
COVERAGE
Coverage should include the core public sector and Crown Entities, but not SOEs.
Crown Companies, educational institutions, schools and hospitals should be included
only if necessary to cover the core public sector and Crown Entity picture.
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
Particular questions that should be addressed include:
•  What have been the advantages of the regime adopted?
•  What has worked well?
•  Is the system demonstrating any fundamental problems?
•  What areas are identified as needing further work to improve the regime?
•  In what areas is further evaluation is most required?
STRUCTURE OF REPORT
The report’s structure is a matter for the Contractor to determine, after reviewing the
material. The report’s structure should be reviewed with the Crown before the first draft
is started.
EXISTING REGIME
For the purposes of the report, the existing regime should be taken to include:
•  The present accountability system, including its relative emphasis on outputs,
outcomes and treatment of inputs
•  Emphasis on Chief Executive performance with increased managerial freedom,
including input choice and financial management
•  Central setting of strategic priorities
•  Purchase/ Ownership split
•  Separation of operations/ policy/ regulation
•  Use of more competitive/ commercial models for service delivery
•  Present institutional structures
•  Reforms embodied in the State Sector Act and Public Finance Act
•  Introduction of GAAP and Accrual accounting
•  Current human resource management approaches
In general, we would prefer that relatively more attention be paid to the first 6 items in the
list above, although all items should be covered.37
COUNTERFACTUAL
The counterfactuals for the purposes of the summary should include both:
•  How does the system meet the objectives expressed for it? These might include:
•  Assisting the Government to translate its strategy into action
•  Informing decision making and accountability
•  Encouraging a responsive and efficient public sector
(See Treasury (1997), “Putting It Together”, p67)
•  How has the system operated compared with the pre-reform environment prior to
1988?
TIMING
A draft report should be provided by 15 December 1999. The Crown will provide
comments by 16 December, allowing finalisation by 17 December. The Contractor will
provide the report in both hard copy and in electronic form saved in either Word 6 or
Word 7 format.
RESOURCES
It is envisaged that 5-7 days of the Contractor’s time will be required.
MATERIAL TO REVIEW
This lists some material that should be considered, not necessarily in equal depth. The
Contractor is likely to be aware of other material.
Basil Logan (1991), “Review of State Sector Reforms”
Treasury (1997), “Putting It Together”
Murray Petrie (1998), “Organisational Transformation: The Income Support Experience”
SSC Working papers
Allen Schick (1996), “The Spirit of Reform – Managing the New Zealand State Sector in
a Time of Change”
Jonathan Boston – especially (1999), “The New Zealand Model of Public
Management: A Brief Assessment”, 31 May 1999 (This also lists other
reviews.)
Public Sector Performance reports including Hitchiner and PSP (1999),
“Evaluation of Ex Ante Accountability Documentation” (Report to Treasury)
OECD (1999) New Zealand Economic Survey
Graham Scott (1996) “Government Reform in New Zealand” IMF occasional
paper 140
Controller and Auditor General (1999) “Third Report for 1999”
Jim Brumby, Peter Edmonds, Kim Honeyfield (1996), “Effects of Public Sector38
Financial Management Reform (FMR) in New Zealand”, July 1996, paper to
Australasian Evaluation Society Conference
Brian Easton, (1997), “The Commercialisation of New Zealand”
Jane Kelsey
Victoria Link – case studies
Comments by former Ministers, after experience with the reforms.
Surveys of views of Departmental Chief Executives and Ministers on the reforms (eg
Brenda Tahi – thesis on strategic management.)
Treasury, Financial Management Reviews summaries
Other possible sources of material for review include:
Treasury: List of Publications/Papers on Public Sector Reform
Jonathan Boston, John Martin, June Pallot and Pat Walsh (1996), “Public
Management – The New Zealand Model”, Bibliography, pp 372- 396
Much of the material in these last two lists is earlier material. We would not expect that it
all be reviewed.